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TRANS-LITERACY WITHIN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: DE/FUSING GENDER AND SEX
NIKKO HARADA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Different though the sexes are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation
from one sex to the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep
the male or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of
what is above.'
One of the constant struggles in modem constitutional law is the search for an
appropriate balance between the need to protect individual autonomy while allowing
states to regulate in furtherance of legitimate societal interests. This Comment
discusses the legal position of the transgender prisoner within the Eighth Amendment context, the implications of individual autonomy, and the needed recognition
of an essential right to gender identity.2 This Comment argues for a broader
conception of gender within a continuum, with an attendant recognition of broader
gender-identity rights. It recognizes "that each time there is a movement to confer
rights on some new 'entity,' the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening...
[because] one consequence of this broader reconfiguration of rights.. .is to give
or things which, by virtue of their object relation... historically
voice to those people
3
have no voice.",

The fundamental problem facing transgender4 prisoners is not the high showing
required to state an Eighth Amendment claim nor the various tests deployed by the
courts to test that claim. The problem is the utilization and assumption of genderbinarism within the law itself. This problem results in potential harm to transgender
prisoners due to their classification in prison, disparate prison conditions, denial of
equal protection of the laws, and ultimately a denial of transgender prisoners' rights
to their gender identity as part of their essential personhood. This Comment asserts
that transgender prisoners should have an essential right not only to their gender
identities but also the ability to gain recognition of that right through the Eighth
Amendment and other legal contexts. Part II discusses the Eighth Amendment
claims made by transgender prisoners. It explains the general contours of the Eighth
Amendment and then examines the only U.S. Supreme Court decision involving a
transgender prisoner and its progeny. Part Ill discusses the limits on the Eighth
Amendment's usefulness as a basis for a transgender prisoners' claim. It notes the
* Class of 2007, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Michael M.
Browde for his invaluable guidance and input on this Comment. Additionally, I am grateful for the help of
Professors James W. Ellis, Ron Wheeler, and Mark Chaiken and Judge Joseph Alarid. I am especially indebted to
Nathan Fox for his support and critique. Special thanks to Denise Chanez and Jaime Fontaine. This Comment could
not have been written without the advice and support of my family, partner, and friends: Stan, Suki, and Kiichi
Harada; Stephen M. Sandoval; and Kate Girard and Erin O'Connell.
1. VIRGINIAWOOLFE, ORLANDO 189 (1928).
2. "It is never clear.. .how to draw the line between one broad, vague, morally laden constitutional textual
provision as applied to situation X and another one (or perhaps the same one) as applied to situation Y." Abner S.
Greene, Theories of Taking the ConstitutionSeriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1406 (2005).
3. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401,425-26 (1987).
4. See infra Part Ml.A.
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difference between sex and gender and problems with reliance upon experts to
define transgender prisoners' gender identity. It explains the possibility for
psychological harm, as well as the difficulties the high showing of deliberate
indifference places on transgender prisoners. In addition, it notes the implications
for privacy of transgender status as a result of the Eighth Amendment requirements.
Part IV explores other potential bases for claims by transgender prisoners other than
the Eighth Amendment, including Equal Protection and Procedural Due Process, as
well as the potential development of that jurisprudence in the future.5
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment prohibits, inter alia, the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments.6 It applies to persons who have already been convicted of and
sentenced for crimes.7 It has been applied to claims arising under different contexts
including medical and psychiatric care, prison conditions, and the use of force
against prisoners. 8 Historically, the willingness of the courts to intervene on behalf
of prisoners has varied.9
However, the bedrock principle underlying the Eighth Amendment is recognition
of evolving standards of decency.'0 Although the Eighth Amendment applies
generally to prisoners' claims, this Part examines its application to transgender
prisoners' claims.
The cases construing alleged Eighth Amendment violations involving transgender
prisoners challenge the outer boundaries of that evolving standard of decency. There
5. For the purpose of this Comment, I will use the term "transgender" because it includes individuals who
have not undergone surgical transition. In addition, since almost all of the caselaw involved in this area discuss only
biological male-to-female (MTF) individuals, the term "transgender," in the context of this Comment, is limited
to those persons. See infra Part I.B. But see infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text. Transgender can include
anyone who interrogates and "transgresses" gender and sex identities, including biological female-to-male persons
and intersex persons. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US
(1995). An analysis of why all the cases involve MTF individuals is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
possible explanation, see generally PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK, EXPLODING THE MYTHS OF MALE AND
FEMALE (1996) (arguing that GID diagnosis is more prevalent in males than in females and may reflect a greater
social concern over male gender role than female). See also infra note 157. The term "biological" means the sex
assigned at birth to an individual. David Seil, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Transgendered Patients, in
TRANSGENDER SUBJEcTIvITEs: A CLtNICIAN'S GUIDE 99 (Ubaldo Leli & Jack Dreschler eds., 2004). This Comment
will not address sexual orientation or sexual identity of transgender individuals.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
7. LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 602 (6th ed.
2002).
8. Id. at 602-54.
9. Id. at 332. In the 1800s, prisoners were viewed as "slaves of the state" and were not considered to have
any rights at all. Id. at 333-34. In the 1900s, the courts gradually began to recognize the constitutional rights of
prisoners but followed the "hands-off doctrine" either because of separation of powers concerns-the judiciary
would be usurping legislative and executive branches charged with the supervision and operation of prisons; or
federalism-the judiciary would be encroaching on state's police powers for punishment of criminals violating state
law. id. at 335. During the 1960s and 1970s, some courts began to refuse to apply the "hands-off doctrine." Id. at
337. This was especially true of the Warren Court, which expansively interpreted the rights of criminal defendants
in other areas. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The modern U.S. Supreme Court has varied
in its approach to prisoners' rights. The Court recognizes constitutional rights of prisoners in areas such as the First
Amendment but refuses to recognize a Fourth Amendment right of prisoners to have their cells free from
unreasonable searches. Id. at 339 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517 (1984)).
10. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").

Summer 2006]

DEFUSING GENDER AND SEX

has been only one Eighth Amendment claim made by a transgender prisoner that has
been examined by the U.S. Supreme Court." This Part will discuss the clarification
of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard announced by that case,
Farmer v. Brennan.12 This Part will also examine how some lower courts have
subsequently attempted to implement Farmerin other transgender prisoner Eighth
Amendment claims.13
A. Farmerv. Brennan
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving a
transgender prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim based upon the failure of prison
officials to prevent harm to her as a result of her placement into the general
population.' 4 The Court decided to hear the case because the federal courts of appeal
"had adopted inconsistent tests for 'deliberate indifference"' for prisoners' claims. '"
Farmer was described by the U.S. Supreme Court as "diagnosed by medical
personnel of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as a transsexual, one who has a
rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about
his or her anatomical sex."' 6 The Court also described in some detail Farmer's
gender history.' 7 The practice of the BOP at that time was to "incarcerate preoperative transsexuals with prisoners of like biological sex," and Farmer herself was
housed sometimes in general male population but more often in segregation. ' It was
undisputed that at least once Farmer was segregated because of safety concerns. 9
Farmer was transferred for disciplinary reasons from a correctional facility to a
penitentiary (USP-Terre Haute). 20 Within the penitentiary, Farmer was initially

11. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
12. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part ll.B.
14. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825. For analysis of the Farmerv. Brennan decision, see Maijorie Rifkin, Farmer v.

Brennan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in a Hidden World, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L REv. 273 (1995).
Rifkin co-authored Farmer's brief to the U.S. Supreme Court and was second chair at the oral argument of the case.
There are various tiers of confinement within the U.S. prison systems, both state and federal. See generally Anita
Barnes, The Sexual Continuum: TranssexualPrisoners,24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.& CIV. CONFINEMENT 599 (1998);
Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: TransgenderedPrisonersCaught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH.

J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000); Christine Peek, Comment, Breaking out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender
Prisoners,Rape, and the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1211, 1247 (2004). For an example of

California's classification system, see infra note 261.
15. Farmer,511 U.S. at 832.
16. Id. at 829 (relying on the AMA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE and APA DSM 111)(internal citations
omitted).
17. The Court called Farmer "a biological male, [who] wore women's clothing.. .underwent estrogen
therapy, received silicon breast implants, and submitted to unsuccessful 'black market' testicle-removal surgery."
Id. (citing the lower court decision of Farmerv. Haas,990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993)). While Farmer's "precise
appearance in prison" was unclear from the record, she claimed to continue hormone treatment in prison "by using
drugs smuggled into prison, and apparently [wore] clothing in a feminine manner, as by displaying a shirt off one
shoulder." Id. The parties agreed that Farmer "project[ed] feminine characteristics" but it is unclear from the opinion
what characteristics are considered "feminine." Id.; see infra Part liLA.
18. Farmer,511 U.S. at 829-30; see infra note 261.
19. Farmer,511 U.S. at 830.

The precise security designations of the two facilities were unclear, but generally, penitentiaries are
20. Id.
higher security facilities and house "more troublesome prisoners than federal correctional institutes." Id.
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placed in administrative segregation and then moved to the general population.2' She
voiced no objection to any prison official about the transfer and placement in
general population.22 Within two weeks of her placement in general population, she
was beaten and raped by another inmate in her cell.23 Several days later she reported
the attack to prison officials who responded by placing her in segregation.24 The
prison officials claimed they put her into segregation to await a hearing regarding
her HIV status.2
Farmer filed a pro se Eighth Amendment claim alleging a failure to prevent harm
by the prison and its officials.26 She alleged that either transfer or placement of her
within the general population violated the Eighth Amendment where, "despite
knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate
assaults, ... [Farmer] as a transsexual who 'projects feminine characteristics' would
be particularly vulnerable to sexual attacks by some USP-Terre Haute inmates. 27
The prison officials moved for summary judgment.28 The district court denied
Farmer's request to stay the proceeding pending discovery and granted summary
judgment, concluding there was no deliberate indifference where the prison officials
were not "reckless in a criminal sense, meaning that they had actual knowledge of
a potential danger. '29 That court found it dispositive that Farmer had never
expressed any concern for her safety. 30 The Seventh Circuit affirmed without
opinion. 31 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that prison officials have an affirmative duty
to prevent harm to prisoners at the hands of other prisoners.32 According to the
Court, "Prison conditions may be 'restrictive and even harsh,' but gratuitously
allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no 'legitimate
penological objective[ ].'33 However, not "every injury suffered by one prisoner at
the hands of another... translates into constitutional liability for prison officials
34
responsible for the victim's safety.
Eighth Amendment claims of the type brought by Farmer must satisfy a twoprong test. 35 The first prong requires that the "deprivation alleged must be,

21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 830.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 830-31.
27. Id. at 831.
28. Id. Farmer responded by asking the district court to delay ruling until the prison officials had complied

with pending discovery requests. Id. Farmer had mistakenly put the same date for defendants' responses to
production as the date for the response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d
1444, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining the procedural history of the case). The trial court decided her FED. R. CIv.
P. 56(f) motion would not help, because any responses to her requests for production would be untimely to help her
respond to defendants' summary judgment motion. Id.
29. Farmer,511 U.S. at 831.

30. Id. at 832.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 833.
33. Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
34. Id. at 834.

35. Id.
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objectively, 'sufficiently serious."' 36 To satisfy this prong a prisoner must show she
"is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." 37 The
second prong is based upon the principle that the Eighth Amendment only protects
against "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 38 This means that prison
officials charged with violating the Eighth Amendment must have sufficiently
culpable states of mind. 39 As such, the prison official must have had a deliberately
indifferent state of mind.4° The Farmer decision sought to define and clarify the
meaning of deliberate indifference.
Farmer argued for a civil recklessness standard,4 which the Court rejected and
instead decided that an Eighth Amendment violation requires "consciousness of a
risk" by the prison officials.42 Additionally, the Court stated that use of the word
"deliberate" to describe the culpable state of mind "arguably requires nothing more
than an act (or omission) of indifference to a serious risk that is voluntary, not
accidental. 43 In other words, the Court held that a prisoner must demonstrate that
the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety."
"[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."45
In responding to concerns raised by Farmer, 6 the Court broadened possible bases
for satisfying the deliberate indifference standard and elaborated on potential
defenses for prisons.
The Court was not convinced that a subjective standard would allow prison
officials to ignore obvious dangers to prisoners, as argued by Farmer.4 7 A prisoner
is not required to show a prison official acted or failed to act, believing "harm would
actually befall an inmate., '48 "[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act
despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm., 49 The Court also left
open the possibility to impute knowledge to a prison official where there was' 5a0
showing of "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted
substantial risk of inmate attacks in the past and the official must have been exposed
to the information concerning the risk and therefore must have known about it.5' The
key to the subjective deliberate indifference standard is that it is from the prison
official's point of view.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The recklessness standard means that "a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knew facts which
rendered an unreasonable risk obvious... the defendant should have known of the risk and will be charged with such
knowledge as a matter of law." Id. at 837 n.5 (citing Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5).
42. ld. at 840.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 837.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 843-48.
47.

Id. at 842.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court determined that Farmer's concern that prison officials would escape
liability by arguing that they did not know the precise identity of the attacker was
unfounded.52 A prisoner can establish deliberate indifference by showing that she
belongs to "an identifiable group of prisoners who are frequently singled out for
violent attack by other inmates. ' 53 Thus, "[iut does not matter whether the risk comes
from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner
faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners
in his situation face such a risk. '
However, in deciding Farmer,the Court also created defenses for prison officials.
Prison officials can assert that they were unaware of the risk because they were
unacquainted with underlying facts that would allow a factfinder to impute
knowledge to them.55 They can also assert that "they knew the underlying facts but
believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent." 56 Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk may not be liable if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if harm was not
ultimately averted.5
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the deliberate indifference standard is subjective5 8 and that the lower court erred in finding that advanced notice on the part of the
prison officials is a necessary element of an Eighth Amendment failure to prevent
harm case.59 In remanding for further proceedings consistent with the newly
articulated deliberate indifference standard, 6° the Court relied upon statements in the
pleadings that tended to corroborate that Farmer, as a "non-violent transsexual who,
because of... youth and feminine appearance [was] likely to experience a great deal
of sexual pressure in prison.'
Justice Blackmun joined the majority because "it create[d] no new obstacles for
prison inmates to overcome, and sen[t] a clear message to prison officials that their
affirmative duty.. .to provide for the safety of inmates [wa]s not to be taken
lightly." 62 Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion but did not join.63

52. Id. at 844.
53. Id. at 843 (citing Brief of Respondents at 15).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
59. Farmer,511 U.S. at 849.
60. Id. at851.
61. Id. at 849.
62. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., concurring). However, Justice Blackmun's concurrence disagreed that "barbaric
prison conditions may be beyond the reach of the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed
individually culpable." Id. at 851. He argued that "[wihether the Constitution has been violated 'should turn on the
character of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it."' Id. (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Justice Blackmun interpreted the majority opinion as
holding that "prison officials may be held liable for failure to remedy a risk so obvious and substantial that the
officials must have known about it.. .and prisoners need not await a tragic event.. before obtaining relief." Id. at
852.
Notably, Justice Blackmun summarized the gender history of Farmer in a slightly different way, noting
that "[d]espite his overtly feminine characteristics, and his previous segregation at a different federal prison because
of safety concerns, prison officials.. housed him in the general population." Id. (citation omitted). He emphasized
that rape and other violence among prison inmates serves no penological purpose. Id. He criticized the majority,
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Since Fannerwas decided, courts have continued to struggle with how to adjudicate transgender prisoner claims. The following Part discusses some of the decisions
that attempt to implement the Farmer.EighthAmendment analysis. The first subpart
discusses cases that were decided by the first prong of the Fannertest while the
second subpart discusses cases turning upon the second prong of that same test.
B. Post-FarmerTransgenderPrisonerClaims
1. Cases Decided on the First Prong, Determining Whether the Harm Alleged
Is a Sufficiently Serious Deprivation or Violation
a. DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections
Miki Ann DiMarco was "born intersexual (or as a hermaphrodite)." 6 The court
relied upon expert testimony 65 to find that DiMarco's "gender ambiguity was
congenital in nature and the result of a disruption in her gonadal development
resulting in non-typical hormone production." 66 The court determined that "a person
is intersexual if they have both male and female characteristics, including in varying
degrees reproductive organs, secondary sexual characteristics, and sexual
behavior., 67 The court found that DiMarco "is closer to being a hermaphrodite than
either a male or female. [She] has a nearly complete set of male reproductive organs
however does not have testicles. [She] has no female reproductive organs. 6 8 The
court referred to DiMarco with the feminine pronoun throughout its decision. 69
DiMarco was housed in a women's correctional facility in general population
until it was discovered that she had a penis, 70 at which point she was put into solitary
isolation with attendant severely limited privileges.7' This meant she was placed in

stating that its "unduly narrow definition of punishment blinds it to the reality of prison life." Id. at 855. He also
noted that "[a] punishment is simply no less cruel or unusual because its harm is unintended." Id. "The
Framers.. .were also familiar with the cruelty that came from bureaucratic indifference to the conditions of
confinement. [They] understood that cruel and unusual punishment can be administered by a failure of those in
charge to give heed to the impact of their actions on those within their care." Id. (citing Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d
1521, 1544 (9th Cir. 1993)).
63. Id. at 858 (Thomas, J., concurring). He argued that conditions of confinement can never be punishments
unless imposed as part of a sentence. Id. at 859. He found Farmer's case "easy" since "the unfortunate attack that
befell petitioner was not part of his sentence, it did not constitute 'punishment' under the Eighth Amendment." Id.
Justice Thomas determined that the remand decision of the majority did not mean the lower courts reached a wrong
result, but rather
as a cautionary measure undertaken merely to give the Court of Appeals an opportunity to decide
in the first instance whether the District Court erroneously gave dispositive weight to petitioner's
failure to complain to prison officials that he believed himself at risk of sexual assault in the
general prison population.
Id. at 862 n.2.
64. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2004); see infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
65. See infra Part IlI.A.
66. DiMarco, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
67. Id. at 1186.
68. Id. at 1186-87; see supra Part IlI.A.
69. See DiMarco, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 n.1 (citing Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 968 n.l (10th Cir.
1995)) (noting that DiMarco had chosen to live her life and functioned throughout her life as a female, despite the
prison officials' representations that their medical staff had determined DiMarco was anatomically and biologically
male).
70. Id. at 1187.
71. Id. at 1191; see infra note 261.
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the maximum security wing and segregated from the general population.72 Prior to
her transfer to segregated isolation, there were no reported incidents, and DiMarco
"got along just fine with the other female inmates. 73
The Tenth Circuit did not find an Eighth Amendment violation involving
DiMarco because she was provided with "the basic necessities of food, shelter,
clothing and medical treatment. ' 74 Although the court did not find a sufficient
deprivation to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, it questioned "whether or not
less harsh alternatives" were available to the prison officials.75
The court also noted that the Tenth Circuit has recognized psychological pain as
a possible Eighth Amendment violation.76 However, it did not find psychological
harm to DiMarco since she was provided with "basic necessities, 77 despite fourteen
months spent in segregated confinement and "astonishing differences between the
almost dormitory style housing quarters for the general population.. .and the stark,
almost dungeon-like housing quarters" in which DiMarco was housed.78
b. Perkins v. Kansas Departmentof Corrections
In Perkins, the prison had forced Perkins to wear a face mask covering his entire
head simply for being HIV positive. 79 The Tenth Circuit began its analysis from the

position that "the Eighth Amendment forbids the state to punish people for a
physical condition, as distinct from acts. '8° In that case, the Tenth Circuit held that
the trial court had erroneously dismissed Perkins' case .8 Similarly, transgender
prisoners who are automatically placed in restrictive confinement solely based upon
their physical status as transgender may violate the Eighth Amendment where that
placement could result in "constant humiliation" and "extreme mental anguish. 82
Transgender prisoners may be placed into isolation for disciplinary purposes as
well as protective ones. The next case describes a transgendered prisoner who was
placed into isolation for both.
c. Murray v. Bureau of Prisons
Michelle Murray was described by the Sixth Circuit as "both a biologically male
transsexual and a federal prisoner., 83 Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Farmer,the
Sixth Circuit also described Murray's gender history. "Although she has undergone
extensive hormone therapy, has had breast implants, and has been castrated, she

72. DiMarco, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1194.
75. Id. at 1192.
76. Id. (citing Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 810 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating Tenth Circuit
examples of potential Eighth Amendment violations like disseminating humiliating but peneologically irrelevant
details of medical history or making HIV-positive prisoners wear signs that say "I AM AN AIDS CARRIER!")).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1194.
79. Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 810.
81. Id. at 811.
82. Id.
83. Murray v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *I (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997).
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remains anatomically male."' The Sixth Circuit followed Murray's feminine
pronoun usage despite the fact that the government used the masculine pronoun to
refer to her. 5
The BOP placed Murray into isolation on several occasions.86 Some of these
occasions were allegedly to protect Murray from assaults by other inmates.87 Other
times she was put into segregated confinement as penalties for her refusal to wear
a bra. 88 The Sixth Circuit held that the deprivations were not serious enough to
trigger Eighth Amendment violations under the first prong because the "deprivation
alleged must be objectively sufficiently serious."89 The court held that the prison
officials could have "subjected themselves to an Eighth Amendment claim" if they
had failed to place Murray into segregated confinement for safety.' ° The court noted
that defendants' concerns about Murray's safety were fulfilled by the fact that
Murray was attacked after her release from segregated confinement.9' The court
reasoned that defendants' placement of Murray into segregated confinement
following this attack related to risk from retaliation for reporting the attack and
attempts to dissuade her from testifying at a disciplinary hearing against her
attacker.92
The court also found that placing Murray in segregated confinement as a penalty
for refusing to wear a bra was not sufficiently serious to show an Eighth Amendment violation.9 3 The court noted that "an inmate is not entitled to clothing of his
choice, and prison officials do not violate the Constitution simply because the
clothing may be not be aesthetically pleasing or may be ill fitting." 9 Orders
mandating Murray wear a bra are "reasonable efforts to maintain institutional
order" 95 and were not "an exaggerated response. ' 9,
Murray's Eighth Amendment claims related to denial of hair and skin products
necessary to maintain her feminine appearance were also denied.97 The court held
that "[c]osmetic products are not among the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.
Murray's allegations of verbal harassment were also not sufficient to state a claim
although the court did not condone the statements, "the Eighth Amendment does not
afford [it] the power to correct every action, statement, or attitude of a prison official

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (footnote omitted); see infra Part I.A.
Murray, 1997 WL 34677, at *5 n.1.
Id. at *2
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1987)).
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
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with which we might disagree." 99 Ultimately the court affirmed summary judgment
against Murray for all of her claims."°°
Psychological harm may be a sufficiently serious deprivation to satisfy the first
prong in the Tenth Circuit, but most courts do not consider anything short of actual
physical attack serious enough to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation.
Transgender prisoners' assertions of claims based on isolation, humiliation,
retaliation, and sexual harassment have not been considered sufficiently serious
deprivations.'0 ' Moreover, even if transgender prisoners are able to state a claim as
to the first prong, they still must overcome the second prong, mandating the culpable
state of mind for prison officials, to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.
2. Cases Decided upon the Second Prong-Required Culpable State of Mind
by Prison Officials, Deliberate Indifference Standard
a. DiMarco v. Wyoming Departmentof Corrections

In analyzing whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
DiMarco, the court held that prison officials "had a legitimate reason to believe there
was a potential, substantial risk of serious harm to either other... inmates or
[DiMarco] due [to her] physical characteristics."'0 2 The court compared DiMarco's
situation to that of Farmer,°3 noting "[t]he gender and physical characteristics [of
and was ignored by prison
Farmer] present a similar situation to the case at ''hand
4
officials with unfortunate, but predictable results. 0

99. Id. at *3.Murray also claimed physical abuse by prison officials on at least three occasions. Id. The
magistrate judge held that two of the three claims did not state a constitutional claim, and the Sixth Circuit agreed,
so it did not discuss those claims. Id. In the claim that survived, Murray alleged that a prison officer named Caudill
and another unidentified officer approached her in the prison cafeteria. Id. She alleged that Caudill made an insulting
comment about her breasts and that the other officer subjected her to a pat-down search, during which time he
unnecessarily touched her breasts. Id. She sued only Caudill. Id.
The Sixth Circuit noted that while a non-supervisory officer may be liable under certain circumstances
for failure to intervene in stopping the improper actions of another officer, Caudill was not liable under these
circumstances. Id. Since Murray failed to allege that the pat-down search itself was improper or that Caudill directed
the unidentified officer to touch her breasts or that the touch lasted long enough for Caudill to stop it, there was no
liability. Id. Murray additionally alleged that a correctional officer isolated her in a bathroom, removed her clothing,
and repeatedly touched her breasts and buttocks. Id.
100. Id. Murray also made a claim for deliberate indifference to medical need for failure to provide her with
the appropriate dosage of estrogen. Id. at *4.The court recognized that, "since transsexualism is a recognized
medical disorder, and transsexuals often have a serious medical need for some sort of treatment, a complete refusal
by prison officials to provide a transsexual with any treatment at all" would be an Eighth Amendment violation. Id.
However, where Murray was receiving some sort of treatment, the court was "reluctant to second-guess" the
judgment of a physician. Id. Moreover, the court reiterated that Murray does not have a right to a particular form
of treatment, especially given the array of treatments for GID and the controversial nature of some of those
treatments. Id. It held that, in the transgender treatment area specifically, "a federal court should defer to the
informed judgment of prison officials as to the appropriate form of medical treatment." Id. See generally Maggert
v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that transgender prisoner not entitled to sex reassignment surgery);
Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that transgender prisoner had a right to some treatment,
but not estrogen); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing dismissal of transgender
prisoner's Eighth Amendment medical need claim where she claimed no treatment given at all); Supre v. Ricketts,
792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding no Eighth Amendment failure to provide medical treatment violation where
transgender prison denied hormones).
101. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
102. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (D. Wyo. 2004).
103. See supra Part II.A.
104. DiMarco, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
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The court in DiMarco additionally reasoned that "placing an inmate of opposite
gender in a facility like [a women's prison], where it was reported that ninety
percent of its female inmates had been raped, abused, or molested by males,
mandated separate housing."10 5 It held that the prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent and acted in "good faith" when determining where to house DiMarco.o6
The last sentence of the opinion states, "this court also impresses upon the [prison
facilities] the need to develop a plan and procedures to handle future administrative
segregation based upon non-disciplinary issues such as those presented in the case
at hand."'

7

Perils may still befall transgender prisoners even if they are placed in protective
custody. As the next case illustrates, the assumption that a transgender prisoner will
be safe if she is removed from general population is questionable.
b. Greene v. Bowles
Traci Greene was described by the court as "a male-to-female transsexual.. .preoperative, but still display[ing] female characteristics, including developed breasts
and a feminine demeanor, and was undergoing hormone therapy."' 0 8 She was placed
in protective custody because of her "feminine appearance."'09 While in protective
custody, she was assaulted by another inmate, Hiawatha Frezzell, who was
described by the warden as a "predatory inmate.""o Greene was severely attacked
with a mop handle and with a fifty-pound fire extinguisher."' Frezzell had been
placed in protective custody because of testimony against other prisoners about a
prison riot." 12 After the attack, Frezzell was transferred to segregation, and Greene
filed an Eighth Amendment claim against the prison." 3 Summary judgment was
granted in favor of the prison warden and a jury found for all remaining
defendants. '

The trial court granted the warden summary judgment based upon its opinion that
Greene failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
deduce that the warden knew of a substantial risk to her because Frezzell's attack
against her was not sexual. 115 The trial court specifically held that, because the attack

105. Id. at 1194.
106. Id. Although damages in unconstitutional confinement cases are usually based upon the difference
between the harsh conditions of isolated confinement and the conditions in general population, the prison had a
rational concern for safety and security of DiMarco and other inmates. Id. at 1198. DiMarco also failed to show
"lasting or physical damages" resulting from the jail's unconstitutional violation of DiMarco's due process rights,
where her own expert testified that she suffered from personality disorders prior to incarceration and there was no
noticeable damage as a result of her incarceration. Id. As such, the court ordered payment of her attorney's fees,
court costs, and expert costs but granted damages to DiMarco in the amount of only $1,000.00 for violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Id.
107. Id. at 1198.
108. Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2004); see infra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
109. Greene, 361 F.2d at 292.
110. id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at293.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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was not sexual, Greene's
transgender status was "irrelevant to the determination of
'' 16
a substantial risk."
The Sixth Circuit rejected this reasoning, finding that there was sufficient
evidence that Greene was vulnerable not only to sexual assault, but physical assault
such that her presence in protective custody with other inmates without segregation
or other protective measures was a substantial risk to her safety." 7 It also found that
there was sufficient evidence presented for a trier of fact to conclude the warden was
aware of the substantial risk that Frezzell posed to any inmate." ' 8 Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit held that a material question of fact existed regarding the warden's
knowledge of substantial risk of harm to Greene, finding the lower court erred in
granting summary judgment to the warden." 9
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further factfinding. 120 It
found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to impute knowledge of the
substantial risk to the warden,' 2' thus satisfying the deliberate indifference standard.
The deliberate indifference standard was satisfied for the warden for the following
reasons: (1) he noted Greene's physical status as the reason for her placement in
protective custody; 122 (2) he admitted, during his deposition, that "transgendered
inmates are often placed in protective custody because of the greater likelihood of
their being attacked by their fellow inmates"; 23 and (3) Frezzell had a predatory
nature.' 24 The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding because "[d]eliberate
indifference means that the prison official had actual knowledge of a substantial risk
to inmate health or safety and ignored that risk or proceeded in the face of it."' 25

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 294.
119. Id. at295.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 294.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id. at 294-95.

125. Id. at 296 (Rogers, J., dissenting). It is unclear if this would ever be possible for prisoners to demonstrate
or how they would do so. The court noted that when imputing knowledge under deliberate indifference, the warden
must not only be aware of the facts from which knowledge may be imputed but that there must be sufficient
evidence that the warden actually made the inference of risk. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994)). It found that the only evidence supporting an inference of knowledge was the admission that the warden
made that some harms may "befall protective custody inmates." Id. "At most, this admission is a concession that
prison life is inherently dangerous, and particularly so for transgendered inmates." Id. Although the dissent
recognized that at times a particular perpetrator or victim need not be known, "general recognition of some risks
is not enough." Id.; see Farmer,511 U.S. at 844. The dissent argued that the majority imposed an objective standard
of deliberate indifference that was expressly rejected by Farmer.Greene, 361 F.2d at 297 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
The dissent concluded by stating:
Moreover, the majority takes a position that will make it more difficult for prison officials to deal
with the complicated issues involved in incarcerating pre-operative transsexual inmates. These
inmates may not be well-suited to the general populations of either men's or women's institutions, and protective custody may be a warden's best alternative to provide for the safety and
security of transsexual inmates. The majority's broad position that protective custody poses ob-

vious harms to transsexual inmates could impel correctional officials to avoid liability for harms
to these inmates by either placing all transsexual inmates in individual isolation or by building
prisons solely for transsexuals. The Eighth Amendment cannot be read to compel such a result.
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c. Long v. Nix
Although this Comment does not discuss deliberate indifference to medical need,
this case presents a situation where the deliberate indifference standard was applied
prisoner asserted various claims based upon her status as
when a transgender
26
transgender. 1
Merlin C. Long was serving a life sentence at a state penitentiary.' 27 The Eighth
Circuit referred to Long in male pronouns throughout the opinion.12 Long initially
arrived at the penitentiary in "full drag,"'' 29 and at first prison officials refused to let
her 3° wear women's clothing. 3 ' After a hunger strike, Long was allowed to wear
a member of the Parole
women's clothing and make-up on a regular basis 3until
2
Board complained and the "privilege" was revoked.
Long brought a claim against prison officials for conditions of confinement and
deliberate indifference to medical need because the officials denied her 133 the right
to dress in women's clothing while incarcerated."3 However, the Eighth Circuit
focused upon Long's claim of deliberate indifference to alleged medical need and
her claim of deliberate indifference regarding conditions of her
did not examine
5
confinement.13
The Eighth Circuit decided that, because the medical experts who testified at trial
could not come to agreement on whether Long suffered from Gender Identity
Disorder (GID) 136 or cross-dressed for sexual stimulation, 137 Long was not a transsexual according to the court. 138 The experts also disagreed about what was the
appropriate medical treatment for Long. 139 The Eighth Circuit held that "[p]rison
officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment when, in the exercise of their
judgment, they refuse to implement a prisoner's requested course of
professional
treatment. '' "4
In addition to disregarding Long's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim, the court also refused to accept Long's contention that she be provided a
"sensitive psychotherapist trained in gender-identity issues."'' The court found no

126. Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996). Although this case arose within the context of deliberate
indifference to medical need rather than failure to prevent harm in the Eighth Amendment context, it is presented
here to demonstrate the effect experts have on litigation by transgender prisoners within the Eighth Amendment
context.
127. Id. at 762.
128. Id. at 761.
129. Id. at 763.
130. Although the court refused to recognize Long's transgender status because the experts could not agree,
this Comment refers to Long in the female pronoun.
131. Long, 86 F.3d at 763.
132. Id.
133. See infra Part Ill.A.
134. Long, 86 F.3d at 761.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 764; see infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
137. Long, 86 F.3d at 764.
138. Id.; see infra Part IUI.A.
139. Long, 86 F.3d at 765.
140.

Id.

141.

Id. at 766.
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Eighth Amendment violation.' 42 Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that Long failed
to prove that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to her gender identity
disorder because Long had "no apparent interest in overcoming his gender-identity
disorder, [which] frustrated the attempts of prison doctors to treat that disorder by
his consistent refusal of psychological evaluation over the past twenty years."' 4 3
As the above cases demonstrate, since the Farmerdecision, courts have struggled
not only with the implementation of the deliberate indifference standard but also
with how to describe and define the transgender prisoners themselves. It is important
to understand the different meanings of sex and gender to recognize why the courts
have struggled in attempting to classify and adjudicate transgender prisoner
claims.'" The Eighth Amendment's failure to distinguish meaningfully between sex
and gender is why its protections to transgender prisoners are limited.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS A BASIS FOR
TRANSGENDER PRISONER CLAIMS
A. Problems with Sex Versus Gender and Reliance upon Medical Experts
The nature of the United States' penal system informs the treatment of not only
transgender prisoners but prisoners in general. Michel Foucault argued that, when
public executions were abolished, penal punishment became more ephemeral. "45
From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy
of suspended rights. If it is still necessary for the law to reach and manipulate the
body of the convict, it will be at a distance in the proper way, according to strict
rules, and with a much "higher" aim.'46
As punishments have become more attenuated, the need for experts has increased.
"Recourse to psycho-pharmacology and to various physiological 'disconnectors,'
147
even if it is temporary, is a logical consequence of this 'non-corporal' penality."'
This is especially acute where experts are relied upon to establish meanings of terms
like "sex" and "gender" for the courts in transgender prisoner cases.
The terms "sex" and "gender" are presumed to have fixed meanings. However,
many of the meanings ascribed to these terms are a combination of both medical and
social construction. "Sex" as a term usually refers to physical characteristics such

142. See id. at 766.
143. Id.
144. See infra Part M.A.
145. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id.
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as anatomy.'48 Gender, by contrast, usually refers to a social role as distinguished
from biological sex.' 49
The perceived conflict between sex and gender observed by the medical field
resulted in additional terms, such as transsexual. 5 ° Whether the terms transsexual
or transgender are used implicates whether a medical or social meaning is being
promulgated. There is a stigmatizing effect of the medical community's labeling of
non-gender conformity as a psychological disorder. 5 '
Courts have relied upon the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnosisand
StatisticalManualofMental Disorders5 2 in attempting to define transgender inmate
status.' In order for a person to be diagnosed with GD, two components must be
present:' 54 (1) "evidence of a strong and persistent cross-gender identification,"' 55
and (2)"evidence of a persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex."' 1 6 A person cannot be diagnosed

148. See, e.g., Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender Are Different: Sexual Identity and Gender Identity Are

Different, 7 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 320,321 (2002); Sana Loue, Transsexualismin Medicolegal
Limine: An Examination anda ProposalforChange, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 27 (1996). "Sex" can be further broken
down into various components such as chromosomal sex and gonadal sex. See ERwiN K. KORANYI,
TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE MALE, THE SPECTRUM OF GENDER DYSPHORIA 8 (1980). Chromosomal sex refers to
typical male (XY) and typical female (XX); however, various mixtures can coexist in a single individual, which
generally results in an intersex condition. Id. at 9 (using the older term "hermaphrodite"). For a description of
various intersex manifestations, see generally BURKE, supra note 5. Gonadal sex is defined by external and internal
genitalia. KORANYi, supra, at 8; see supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
149. See Seil, supra note 5, at 100-01 (distinguishing biological sex assigned at birth from genetic or
anatomic gender used to designate anatomic characteristics assumed to conform to chromosomal sex). Gender itself
can further be subdivided into gender role and gender identity. Gender role means behavior patterns expected,
learned, or acted according to social expectation. Diamond, supra note 148, at 322. Gender identity is "the
subjective sense of the gender one feels one is, regardless of what genitals a person has." Seil, supra note 5, at 101.
150. Transsexualism was originally defined by Harry Benjamin in 1966 as a mental syndrome. Dallas Denny,
ChangingModels of Transsexualism, in TRANSGENDER SUBiECrIVrTIES: A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE 25, 26 (Ubaldo Leli
& Jack Dreschler eds., 2004). Benjamin, along with Christian Hamburger, also are credited with developing the
phrase "trapped in wrong body." See GORDENE OLGAMACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 72-76 (1994). Benjamin
stated, "Since it is evident, therefore, that the mind of the transsexual cannot be adjusted to the body, it is logical
and justifiable... to attempt the opposite, to adjust the body to the mind." Id. at 21. The first dictionary definition
of the word "transsexual" was "a person having a strong desire to assume the physical characteristics and gender
role of the opposite sex" and "a person who has undergone hormone treatment and surgery to attain the physical
characteristics of the opposite sex." Id. at 12 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
2012-13 (2d ed. 1987)). "Transgender" was originally coined by Virginia Prince and meant individuals living as
their non-biological gender identity without surgical intervention, but the term has been broadened beyond that to
include anyone who transgresses or questions gender boundaries. MACKENZIE, supra note 150, at 2; Denny, supra
note 150, at 30. See generally BORNSTEIN, supra note 5 (arguing that transgender as a term has a broad meaning
that encompasses anyone transgressing gender boundaries). Transgender as an identity can also be viewed as "a
political positioning that draws from postmodern notions of fluidity (for both bodies and genders)." Katrina Roen,
"Either/Or" and "Both/Neither": Discursive Tensions in TransgenderPolitics,27 SIGNS 501 (2002).
151. See infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
152. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM IV].
153. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (relying upon AM. MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDICINE (1989) and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSIS AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d

rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM 111); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing DSM III).
154. DSM IV, supra note 152, at 532, 538. In all GID diagnoses, intersexed individuals are explicitly
excluded.
155. Id. at 532.
156. Id. at 533.
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with GID if it is "merely.. .a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being
the other sex."' 57
Many transgender community members oppose the medicalization of transgenderism. Because the DSM IV identifies transgenderism as a psychological disorder,
it demonstrates that our culture has decided to view transsexualism as an illness, and
therefore pathological and abnormal, rather than reexamining our own concepts of role
and identity. 5 ' "[W]e must seriously question whether transsexualism is a 'disease'
requiring medical intervention or whether it is a cultural symptom of the dis-ease
evoked by challenging the traditional Western sex and gender code."' 159 However,
others note that the transsexual model provides the framework necessary to allow
transsexuals to obtain medical treatment "but at a price: the treatment it prescribedsex reassignment-was predicated on the notion that there were but two genders,
'
and was thus relatively inflexible. '""n
The transsexual model effectively replaces the
"opposite-sex" binary with a different binary of diagnosed versus undiagnosed
62
persons. 161 The male/female binary becomes diagnosed/undiagnosed.1

157. Id. The DSM IV also distinguishes between children, adolescents, and adults with GID. Id. at 532-38.
Although the transgender inmates involved in the case law discussed in this Comment are adults, some
examination of the criteria for children who are diagnosed with GID is essential for understanding the problematic
nature of the DSM IV. In biological boys, GID "is manifested by a marked preoccupation with traditionally
feminine activities," including preference for "dressing in girls' or women's clothes" or improvising with items such
as towels, aprons, and scarves to approximate hair or skirts; playing house; playing with Barbie; avoidance of
"rough and tumble play"; and watching television or video of female characters. Id. at 533. "They may also express
a wish to be a girl and assert they will grow up to be a woman." Id. Sometimes biological boys pretend not to have
a penis, state they wish to have a vagina, or find their penis or testes disgusting and want to remove them. Id. The
DSM IV carefully delineates activities it presupposes are objectively female and therefore inappropriate for
biological boys.
The DSM IV states that adults with GID "are preoccupied with their wish to live as a member of the
other sex," which may manifest itself either as "an intense desire to adopt the social role of the other sex or to
acquire the physical appearance of the other sex through hormonal or surgical manipulation." Id. at 533. It also
acknowledges that adults, "[tlo varying degrees.. .adopt the behavior, dress, and mannerisms of the other sex." Id.
The DSM IV also excludes "simple nonconformity to stereotypical sex role behavior" by measuring "extent and
pervasiveness of the cross-gender wishes" and excludes transvestic fetishism, wherein the adult is cross-dressing
"for the purpose of sexual excitement." Id at 536; see supra notes 128-145 and accompanying text.
When the DSM IV was promulgated, the primary controversy within the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) was whether transvestic fetishism should be a separate diagnosis from GID. 4 AM. PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DSM IV, SOURCEBOOK 1134-37 (1996). There was no discussion of whether GID as a psychological
diagnosis was appropriate. Id. at 1134-35. In addition, because the APA explicitly excluded intersexed individuals,
GD does not address the presumptions of sex/gender differences inherent in the diagnosis criteria. DSM IV, supra
note 152, at 532. But see supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text. GID primarily addresses gender roles, which
"are those behaviors imposed overtly or covertly by society." Diamond, supranote 148, at 323. "Gender and gender
role refer to society's idea of how boys and girls or men and women are expected to behave and should be treated."
Diamond argues these would be better described as sex-typical behaviors, because "[g]ender roles are those
behaviors imposed overtly or covertly by society." Id.
The GID diagnosis is further complicated by the fact that the APA does not distinguish between private
and public performance of gender roles. "Gender identity is the private experience of gender role; and gender role
is the public manifestation of gender identity." Id. Although arguably in an incarceration setting, public and private
spheres may be more conflated than outside that setting.
158. Loue, supra note 148, at 33.
159. MACKENZIE, supra note 150, at 60.
160. Denny, supra note 150, at 28.
161. See infra notes 166-192 and accompanying text; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 43 (Jan. 15, 2005) (on file with author) ("Inmates who have undergone treatment
for gender identity disorder will be maintained at the level of change which existed when they were incarcerated
in the Bureau" and "medical Director must approve, in writing, hormone use for the maintenance of secondary sex
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Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has already acknowledged the problematic
nature of "scientific" evidence in other contexts, stating "arguably, there are no
certainties in science."' 6 3 Yet, courts rely on testimony of medical experts and
medical literature to analyze issues involving transgender persons.'64 "The adjective
'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science." 165
Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. 66 Sex designation as ratified by medical and scientific
judgment appears to carry the weight of certainty.
67 sex is
Despite the fact that sex is assigned upon birth by a human being,
assumed to be a biological and immutable characteristic."6 "Sex is usually assigned
when an infant is born by looking to see whether it has a penis. If it does, it's a boy;
if it doesn't it's a girl."'169 This embedded assumption is what allows the char70
acterization of non-conforming gender role performance as a disorder. Courts
addressing transgender inmate issues spend much of their opinions cataloging the
genetalia and physical characteristics of the inmate. 7' This physical cataloguing
emphasizes an artificial sense of sex and gender, suggesting that, by tallying up the
body parts of a person, she can be relegated to one gender or another. However, the
term transgender also has problematic implications. The use of the term "transgender" in and of itself does not resolve the general assumption by society and by
the courts that gender is properly defined within a binary model.
For transgender prisoners, the necessity for experts is heightened given the lack
of knowledge on the part of the courts 172 and disagreement among the medical
community as to proper treatment for GID 73 In addition, transgender prisoners
often must rely upon prison medical personnel to ratify their claim of transgender

characteristics in writing."). See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 150.
162. See infra notes 200-214 and accompanying text. See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 150; Denny,
supra note 150.
163. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). However, note that in determining
admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court may take into account different
factors, and the primary principle driving admissibility of expert testimony is its ability to assist the trier of fact. It
may be argued that judges unfamiliar with transgender persons would be assisted by scientific testimony regarding
transgender persons.
164. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (relying on AM. MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDICINE and DSM III); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing testimony of a Clinical
Associate Professor of Social Work, Psychiatry, and Behavioral Sciences); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 763-64 (8th
Cir. 1996) (noting that experts agree that plaintiff was not a transsexual because they could not agree whether Long
"primarily want[ed] to wear clothing to achieve sexual arousal or to satisfy his desire to be a woman"); Meriwether
v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing DSM III and an article on tranvestism from J. OF SEX &
MARITAL THERAPY); DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2004) (relying upon
the testimony of a doctor).
165. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Ruth Hubbard, Gender and Genitals, Constructs of Sex and Gender, in CURRENT CONCEPTS
INTRANSGENDER IDENTITY 45, 46 (Dallas Denny ed., 1998).
168. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
169. Hubbard, supra note 167.
170. See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 176-190 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing sex reassignment surgery by
noting that "[s]omeone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric disorder").
173. Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1996).
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identity. 174 GID is still classified as a psychological disorder in the paraphilia
grouping, which can be stigmatizing.' 75
In Farmerv. Brennan, the Court first referred to Farmer as transsexual 176 and then
as "preoperative transsexual[].' 177 In a more recent case, DiMarco v. Wyoming
Department of Corrections,78 the plaintiff is referred to as "intersexual (or as a
hermaphrodite).'

7'

There, the court explained that the prison medical staff

determined DiMarco "anatomically and biologically a male,"' 8 ° but noted she had
lived her entire life and functioned as a female. '' However, the courts generally use
the term "transsexual."' 182 Only one court has used the term "transgender."' 8 3 Other
courts refer to the plaintiff more specifically as pre-operative male-to-female
transsexual' or "diagnosed transsexual.' 8 5 In another case, the court refused to
recognize the prisoner as transgender where the experts were in disagreement as to
whether she cross-dressed for sexual pleasure or as part of GID.8 6
The courts also usually engage in cataloguing of body parts of the transgender
prisoner before analyzing the Eighth Amendment claim. 87 In addition, most courts
refer to the transgender prisoners as "feminine" without defining precisely what is
meant by that term. 188 The very presumption that transgendered persons are
ambiguously gendered presupposes a static gender model in and of itself. Arguably,
174. See, e.g., id. at 763; Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996); Meriwether v. Faulkner,
821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1986).
175. See DSM IV, supra note 152, at 493 (including other diagnoses such as sexual sadism, pedophilia, and
voyeurism); see also supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
176. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994).
177. Id.
178. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004).
179. Id. at 1186.
180. l
181. Id. at 1187 (finding plaintiffs "gender ambiguity was congenital in nature and the result of a disruption
in her gonadal development resulting in non-typical hormone production").
182. See Claybrooks v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 98-6271, 1999 WL 503457, at *1 (6th Cir. July 6, 1999)
("self-described transsexual"); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Reno, No. 981252, 1999 WL 89030, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 1999); Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL
34677, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (describing plaintiff as "biologically male transsexual"); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d
761,764 (8th Cir. 1996) (experts agreed plaintiff was not a transsexual); Gomez v. Maass, No. 90-35390, 1990 WL
177776, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1990); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987); WhittingtonBarrett v. Johnson, No. E2000-00700-COA-23-CV, 2000 WL 1661527, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2000)
(plaintiff identified herself in the complaint as transsexual); Star v. Gramley, 815 F. Supp. 276, 278 (C.D. 111993)
(warden denied that plaintiff was transsexual because she had no "medically documented need to wear women's
clothing"); Pollack v. Brigano, 720 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ohio App. 1998) (Appellant referred to herself as a
"transsexual suffering from gender dysphoria.").
183. See Tates v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 WL 23864868, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003).
184. See Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004).
185. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
186. Long, 86 F.3d at 764.
187. See Greene, 361 F.3d at 292 (noting "developed breasts" but "preoperative"); DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't
of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186-87 (D. Wyo. 2004) (noting that "plaintiff bore a penis" and "has a nearly
complete set of male reproductive organs however does not have testicles.. .[and] has no female reproductive
organs"); Tates, 2003 WL 23864868, at *1 (noting "breasts sufficiently enlarged" to require a bra); Schwenk, 204
F.3d at 1192 (noting that prisoner "has shoulder-length hair"); Murray, 1997 WL 34677, at *1 (noting that prisoner
had "breast implants" and "has been castrated, [but] she remains anatomically male").
188. See Greene, 361 F.3d at 292 (stating that prisoner "displayed female characteristics" and had a "feminine
appearance"); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (stating that "parties agree that [Farmer] projects
feminine characteristics"). But see Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193 (describing prisoner as "extremely soft-spoken and
feminine, cries easily, and uses make-up and other female grooming products when possible").
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the courts are attempting to grapple with the complexities of ambiguous gender
identity by acknowledging the various prisoners' characteristics and using the
pronouns consistent with the prisoners' self-identity assertions.' 89 The courts'
apparent failure to even know how to describe the prisoners highlights their reliance
upon experts to define the transgender prisoners' identities. As aptly explained by
Ruth Colker, "a legal system without categories is impossible... [but] the legal
system is overly reliant on bipolar categories....We can break down this needless
bipolarity by adding more individualized decisionmaking to the legal system while
not entirely displacing the use of categories.""
B. PsychologicalHarm
The potential for psychological harm resulting from automatic classification
based on transgender status could improve adjudication of transgender prisoner
Eighth Amendment claims. The automatic placement of transgender prisoners, even
if based on a proffered safety purpose, could violate the Eighth Amendment if it
unnecessarily discloses their transgender status or results in extreme psychological
harm. 191 However, in DiMarco, the court found that the placement of the prisoner
in administrative segregation was necessary for her safety, and, as such, was not
punishment based solely on her physical characteristics per se, despite potential
availability of less drastic means to the prison. 92 In Tates v. Blanas, the automatic
classification of transgender prisoners based solely on physical characteristics was
discriminatory. 93 Scholar Darren Rosenblum relates, inter alia, Dee Farmer's
description of her imprisonment:
A transgendered woman who has undergone extensive hormonal therapy and
cosmetic surgery, is convicted and imprisoned. Because she still has a penis,
albeit a nonfunctioning one, prison officials categorize her as a male, and place
her in a men's prison. "You were born a boy, and you're going to stay a boy,"
the prison doctor says, rejecting a continuation of her long-term estrogen
treatment. Her body begins to regain the masculinity she had largely escaped.
Bruised by the changes, her body no longer feels like her own, but one imposed
on her by the criminal justice system. Her femininity stands out among the male
prisoners who repeatedly rape and beat her. Trapped, not only in her body, but
in a prison that refuses to recognize and respect her gender identity, she castrates
herself with glass and used razors.' 94

While Rosenblum's description is largely based upon placement in the general
prison population and lack of medical treatment, the psychological impact of the
prison's refusal to recognize transgender identity is a psychological harm in and of
itself. Although the physical harm attendant to placement in the general population

189. See infra Part V.
190. RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BisExuALs, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MisFITs UNDER AMERICAN LAw 233

(1996).
191.
(10th Cir.
192.
193.
194.

See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999); Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803
1999); see also infra Part M.D.
See DiMarco, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
Tates v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 WL 23864868 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003).
Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 500 nn.l-6.
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may be mitigated by placement in protective custody or administrative segregation,
the denial of interaction with other human beings and extreme isolation may bring
their own psychological harms. This may be especially acute for the transgender
prisoner where that isolation is a result of transgender status alone. Despite the fact
that psychological harm can be a sufficiently serious deprivation to satisfy the first
prong, at least in the Tenth Circuit, it does not appear that courts have considered
anything short of actual95physical attack serious enough to demonstrate an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Several scholars have noted the problems transgender prisoners face.'96 Various
solutions have been proposed, most aimed at the prisons and their problems. The
suggestions by scholars include administrative segregation 97 and transgender-only
wards.' 98 Most scholars argue that placement of transgender prisoners should be
based upon gender identity rather than genitalia inventory. 99 At the same time, some
have concerns about gender-identity-based classification, such as other prisoners not
wanting to share a cell with a transgender prisoner,2"° transgender prisoners
engaging in sex with female inmates if housed within a women's facility,20 ' and
transgender prisoners being violent against other inmates.20 2
C. The Showing Required to Satisfy the DeliberateIndifference Standard
The subjective deliberate indifference standard established by Farmer2°3 places
a high burden on transgender litigants to establish liability for prisons. The Farmer
standard 2 4 requires that the prison official either actually know of the risk of harm
to a transgender prisoner or the risk of harm is so obvious that knowledge may be
imputed. 2 5 However, in imputing knowledge, the transgender litigant must
demonstrate not only that the risk was obvious, but that enough facts exist to
establish that a prison official drew the inference of harm from those facts.2°6 "The
fact that plaintiffs bear this burden creates an incentive for guards to ignore
problems ....
Even if a guard could be held liable for failure to investigate facts

195. See supra Part Il.B.I.
196. See generally Barnes, supra note 14; Richard Edney, To Keep Me Safe From Harm? Transgender
Prisoners and the Experience of Imprisonment, 9 DEAKIN L. REv. 327 (2004); Peek, supra note 14; Rosenblum,
supra note 14.
197. See Barnes, supra note 14, at 638 (arguing that segregation should only be used for short periods of time,
where it is not voluntary, heightened standards should attach, and the conditions should mirror general population);
Peek, supra note 14, at 1239-40 (noting segregation results in more limited privileges for transgender prisoners and
"often burdens the victims more than the aggressors" while failing to protect against attacks by guards).
198. See Peek, supra note 14, at 1240 (noting that prisons would have problems deciding who would qualify
for placement and the problems in New York's prison system where transgender persons and homosexuals are often
amalgamated); Rosenblum, supranote 14, at 534 (noting same problem with conflagration of transgenderism and
homosexuality, but arguing that transgender persons would be freer to express their gender identity and smaller
prisons could offset costs by states pooling resources to provide centralized services).
199. See Barnes, supra note 14, at 645-46; Edney, supra note 196, at 337; Peek, supra note 14, at 1241;
Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 531.
200. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991); Rosenblum, supra note 14 at 531-32.
201. See Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 532. But see Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 667.
202. See Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 532.
203. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
204. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
205. Farmer,511 U.S. at 843.

206. Id.

Summer 2006]

DEFUSING GENDER AND SEX

underlying a substantial risk...higher prison officials would still be insulated on the
2 7 Although this high standard
ground that they had no knowledge of the omission.""
applies to any prisoner's claim, it is especially troublesome for a transgender litigant
who must prove her transgender status as part of her claim, as well as knowledge of
her status by prison officials. The disclosure of her transgender status can have
implications for her right to have her transgender status private.
D. Privacy of TransgenderStatus
Although prisons now have an affirmative duty to protect transgender prisoners
from the violence of other inmates in the general population after Farmer,20 8 prisons
may also risk liability if they disclose a prisoner's transgender status during the
course of protecting her. 209 For example, a transgender prisoner sued a guard for
violating her constitutional right to privacy by disclosing her transgender status in
the presence of other inmates and prison staff.2 10 In that case, Powell v. Schriver,21
the court stated that "[t]he excruciatingly private and intimate nature of
transsexualism, for persons who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really
beyond debate., 21 2 The court held "that individuals who are transsexuals are among
213
those who possess a constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality.,
However, that privacy right is subject to waiver if the transgender prisoner enters
into some sort of agreement, such as a settlement, that makes the matter public
record.214 Unless the disclosure serves a legitimate penological purpose,2' 5 it is a
constitutional violation.216 The court found it hard to imagine a circumstance in
which a disclosure of transgender status would further such a purpose, especially in
light of the fact that "such disclosure may lead to inmate-on-inmate violence. "217
Female inmates learned of a transgender prisoner's status in Crosby v.
Reynolds,218 although the record is unclear as to how. In that case, a female inmate
complained that her constitutional privacy rights were violated when a transgender
prisoner, Cheyenne Lamson, 219 was placed into the same cell as her. 220 The female
inmate believed her privacy right had been violated because Lamson allegedly
repeatedly came into the inmate's cell while she was on the toilet (although Lamson
immediately left upon "learning of the plaintiff's position") 22 and the inmate

207. Peek, supra note 14, at 1244.
208. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (D. Wyo. 204); Tales v. Blanas,
No. S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 WL 23864868, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003); see also supra Part II.A.
209. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 109.
211. Id. at 11. .
212. Id. at 112.
213. Id. at 111.
214. Id. at III n.1.
215. Id. at 112.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 113. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994)).
218. 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991).
219. Id. at 667 (stating that Lamson was "a/k/a Cheyenne Deneuve a/k/a Roger Miles...a 6'1 preoperative
male transsexual").
220. Id. at 666-67.
221. Id. at 667.
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decided not to take a shower when Lamson entered the common room and would
not leave.222
The court determined that a female inmate's constitutional right to privacy was
not clearly established enough to state a claim 223 when a transgender prisoner would
be in "severe jeopardy '2 24 if placed in a general male prison population. In addition,
it noted that "segregation... was not an ideal situation ' 225 and placement with the
female population best satisfied the transgender prisoner's needs. 226 The court also
noted that that transgender prisoner was no threat to the female inmates because,
although her male genetalia was anatomically intact,2 27 she had virtually no sexual
capacity as a male.228 However, the court was careful to note that it was not "called
upon to decide whether a right to privacy229would be clearly invaded if males and
females generally were housed together.,
The automatic placement of transgender prisoners into either protective custody
or segregated confinement could be seen as a disclosure of the prisoners' status
because usually prisoners do not receive higher classifications unless they are a
"snitch" or a disciplinary problem. 23 Moreover, placement of a transgender prisoner
23
within her target identity facility could still create issues if her status is disclosed. '
E. Summary of Eighth Amendment Considerations
The lower courts have analyzed transgender prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims
in very different ways depending on the type of violation involved and the nature
of the prisoner herself. In dictum, the Farmer decision 23 2 suggested other
alternatives for prison liability on Eighth Amendment grounds. For example, if there
were a pattern and practice of deprivations against transgender prisoners, that could
be sufficient for prison liability. 233 It also seemed to open a basis for class-suits,
noting that "a prisoner can establish exposure to a sufficiently serious risk of harm
by showing that he belongs to an identifiable group of prisoners who are frequently
singled out for violent attack by other inmates. '234 Furthermore, "it does not matter
whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it
matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to
him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk. ' 235 Although this claim
is specifically based within Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it could be read as a
type of equal protection challenge for transgender persons as a class.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 669.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 667.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 670 (noting that state law standards for jails would preclude such integrated housing).
230. See Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2004); DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp.
2d 1183, 1995 (D. Wyo. 2004).
231. Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991).
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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Although the courts have expanded beyond the traditional gender binary in some
contexts, such as employment law and sex discrimination,236 some are less willing
to recognize a gender continuum in the prison context.237 The next section begins
with examination of transgender prisoner claims within the legal contexts outside
of the Eighth Amendment 238 involving prisoners but utilizing different legal bases
to evaluate those claims. It discusses ramifications for recognition of transgender
group identity rights 239 as well as other avenues for individual transgender prisoner
claims. 2'
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL BASES FOR TRANSGENDER PRISONER CLAIMS
OTHER THAN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Not all of the courts' decisions involving transgender prisoners have utilized
Farmerv. Brennan to analyze claims arising in the Eighth Amendment context. The
following section discusses some transgender prisoner claims that open possibilities
to other legal avenues for transgender prisoners.
A. Equal Protection
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California examined an Eighth
Amendment claim using a discrimination-based analysis. 24 1 Ultimately, the court
gave the jail officials a time by which they must provide the court with a proposed
plan for correcting the deficiencies the court identified.242 There has been no further
action on the matter.
Tates was described as "a pre-operative transgender, male to female, pretrial
detainee."24 3 He was self-described as a "36-year old biological male who has selfidentified as female for at least the past 18 years." 2 " Tates asked the court to refer
to him using masculine pronouns "because he is in a men's jail. ' 245 He weighed
approximately 125 pounds upon arrival at the jail, and about 154 pounds at the time
of trial. 2' He described himself as a "very effeminate transgender, ' '247 and the court
found that "[hlis voice, appearance, and demeanor are consistent with his selfidentified gender., 24' His breasts were sufficiently enlarged for the jail medical staff
to issue him a bra. 249 When Tates was not incarcerated he wore women's clothing,
but while incarcerated wore men's clothing except for the bra.250

236. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
237. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (holding that segregation of the sexes in prisons is
a rational purpose).
238. See infra PartIV.
239. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
240. See infra Part Iv.C.
241. Tares v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 WL 23864868 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003).

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *1 n.2.
Id. at *1.
Id.; see supra note 5.

248. Tates, 2003 WL 23864868, at *1.
249. Id.

250. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

The court also described the exact conditions Tates was subject to in total
separation, which included shackling and manacling when transported to court and
while moving within the jail or while in holding cells;215' restricted access to
religious services; 25 2 restricted access to the dayroom where showers and telephones
are available; 253 less sanitary cells; 25 4 and decreased access to showers than other
prisoners. 25 Tates also alleged being subjected to ridicule and abuse including
derogatory language, threats of rape, forced meals on the floor, and unprovoked
general threats of violence.256
The court described in detail California's prisoner classification system. 257 The
California State Prison system has various tiers of confinement.25 8 The highest level
of classification is called "total separation," which is the most restrictive type of
classification within that system. 259 The jail automatically classified all transgender
inmates into total separation "regardless of their behavior, criminal history, whether
they pose a danger to others, or any other characteristic. ' '26
The court found most of the abuse "originated with other inmates, including
trustees. ' 26' The court found that despite some diversity training for jail deputies,
there was no training specifically concerning transgender prisoners, and no
reasonable attempts
had been made to train trustees and guards to stop transgender
262
harassment.

The court did not deploy the Farmertest 263 to examine Tates' claims, despite the
fact that Tates was allegedly placed in total separation out of concern for his safety
and potential liability if he were given a less restrictive classification. 2 ' Although
the court acknowledged that prison officials may have a duty to treat transgender
prisoners differently to "protect them from violence at the hands of other

251. Id. at *4.
252. Id. (noting that this may be due to the fact that prisoners classified as total separation must have a guard
present at all times when the chaplain meets with them, despite the fact that the chaplain expressed no fear of Tates
nor requested a guard be present).
253. Id. at *5-6 (noting that this might be attributable to the requirement that guards be present and not
enough guards are available and the "unusual hours" that Tates was given access to the phone (for example: between
11:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M.) would make it difficult for Tates to call friends, family, or attorneys).
254. Id. at *7.
255. Id.
256. Id. at *8.
257. Id. at *1-4.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *3.
Upon arrival at the Jail, each inmate is "classified" by a Classifications Officer. Most inmates
are classified as "general population." Inmates believed to require special protection (e.g., those
particularly susceptible to victimization by other inmates, or likely to be the target of an attack)
are housed in "protective custody" (aka "P.C."). Inmates who violate rules can be punished by
placement in a special disciplinary category with very restricted privileges. The final
classification mentioned in the record is "total separation," usually abbreviated as "T-sep."
Id. (citations omitted).
260. Id.
261. Id. at *8.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
264. Tates, 2003 WL 23864868, at **3-4.
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prisoners, "265 complete segregation of all transgender prisoners is not always
required.266
The court proposed a number of factors that should be considered by prison
officials when determining whether segregation of transgender prisoners is
appropriate.267 The court held that there was "serious discrimination.. .at this jail
against transgenders" resulting from "failure of [the jail officials] to promulgate
rules and discipline to protect transgenders from discrimination.,

26

'

There was no

analysis of whether the deprivations resulting from differential conditions resulted
in an Eighth Amendment violation nor whether the prison official's institutional
stance in classification of transgender prisoners was deliberately indifferent. Instead,
the court announced that transgender inmates must be similarly treated as other
prisoners, while at the same time acknowledging that not every transgender prisoner
must be treated in an identical manner. 269
The court also noted that despite the fact that the jail did not house "a large
number of transgender inmates ' '27° it was "not a unique circumstance ' '271where the
jail, at that time, housed at least two other transgender inmates and there were
references to at least four during the course of the litigation.2 72 The court also heard
testimony about transgender inmates at other correctional facilities. 3 The court held
that, given those facts, it was likely that at any given time the jail would house at
least some transgender inmates. 274 As such, issues regarding transgender inmates
would be a concern even after Tates himself moved on, especially since the record
indicated that other transgender inmates shared Tates' concerns. 275 The court
emphasized that the classification of transgender prisoners into total separation must
be "based upon facts, not phobias." 276 One way for meaningful classification to
happen is to allow the transgender prisoner herself a voice in the classification
process.
1. Problems with Line-Drawing to Create a Class
The potential problem with an equal protection challenge for transgender
prisoners is precisely how that group would be defined.7 7 The transgender model

265. Id. at *9 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).
266. Id.
267. They included "the design of the facility, whether it is adequately staffed and not overpopulated, the
number of transgender inmates at the facility, and the characteristics of the general inmate population (e.g., whether
the pod houses exclusively non-violent offenders)." Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at *10.
270. Id. at *3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. The jail offered an expert who noted that many jails do not segregate transgender inmates in the same
manner practiced by this jail. Id. at *8. His opinion was that the segregation was necessary because of the jail
design. Id. However, he also conceded that placing Tates in solitary confinement for several years without any
review of his classification would be unconstitutional. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra Part ILA.
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still assumes a unified community of gender outlaws. 278 "[T]he transgender model
tends to render transsexuals invisible. While many transgender people are
comfortable fitting somewhere in the space between the two commonly
acknowledged genders, transsexuals have no doubts about the gender to which they
'
Forcing
belong. They unambiguously identify with the non-natural gender."279
identification of transgender on an individual can also have constitutional
implications.2 80 Transgender, as a model, also impacts legal protections.28'
the community about whether one should be
Moreover, there are schisms within
"out" about a transgender identity.28 2 "Postmodern articulations of the question, to
pass or not to pass, are central to current transgender/transsexual dialogues.
According to some transgenderists, passing as the 'other sex' is the ultimate sellout. ' 283 In essence, presumption of monolithic transgender identity establishes
hierarchies:
Transgenderism (the both/neither stance) exalts outness, fluidity, and
transgression. Therefore, who counts (as a gender outlaw) depends on how

possible it is to be out. Who counts as transsexual (in the sense of the either/or
stance) rests on who can pass, which depends partially on who has access to
reassignment technologies, and is therefore influenced by class, race, education,
and so on. This suggests that the both/neither position and the either/or position
are problematic in2 84terms of exclusivity and their failure to account for socioeconomic factors.

Since transgenderism is not monolithic, it makes courts faced with the issue of
classifying transgender inmates weigh in on the authenticity of an inmate's gender
identity. 285 Where a court privileges one iteration of a gender identity as valid, it
may create a bright line rule that excludes individuals who are transgender.286
However, at the present time, courts generally do not use the term transgender, and
rely upon the term transsexual and a medicalized model of gender identity.287
Although many in the transgender community reject a medicalized identity,288
that medicalized definition of gender identity has been used by some transgender
persons for litigation based on disability discrimination. 289 Furthermore, the

278. See generally BORNSTEIN, supra note 5; MACKENZIE, supra note 150.
279. Denny, supra note 150, at 32.
280. See infra Part IV.B.
281. Denny, supra note 150, at 26 (noting that, "if a political entity offers protection from discrimination
based on a perceived disability (transsexualism), what happens when that disability is destabilized?"); see Loue,
supra note 148, at 15 (noting that some states allow sex reassignment surgery to be paid for under medical insurance
if transsexuality is viewed as a disability); see also infra Part IV.B.
282. See generally Roen, supra note 150, at 501.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 511.
285. See, e.g., Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996).
286. See supra notes 166-192 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 166-192 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 160-177 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., In re Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. 2003).
Nevertheless, a reliance on a medical model of transsexuality, despite its disempowering
potential, is often deemed necessary for the provision of public and private medical insurance
benefits for transsexuals, adequate treatment in prison, relief from arrest, and other benefits as
well as a justification for the gender reassignment surgery sought by transsexuals.
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assertion of a gender continuum in place of a gender binary would reject the linedrawing necessary to create a legal group. 290 Kate Bornstein, a transgender activist,
writes:
I think that a transgender identity and, indeed a transgender movement both have
a built-in obsolescence. If in fact we're setting about to dismantle the binary of
gender, the system against which we're transgressing; and if in fact everyone is
transgendered... then there's going to come a time when more people admit it
than don't....When that happens, there won't be any value to the term
'transgender,' and a new challenge will have risen up, new political identities
will raise their heads, and the transgender movement will be shown to its proper
place as some historical oddity, back in the days when people thought there were
only two genders. 29'

2. Potential Levels of Judicial Review
Transgender prisoners' attempts to establish an equal protection claim, at least on
quasi-suspect class basis, have been rejected.292 Strict scrutiny has been applied to
other statutory regimes based upon gender,293 but intermediate scrutiny is usually
used for classifications based upon sex or gender.2'
The Court held that having gender-based differential grooming standards for male
and female inmates did not violate equal protection.295 If the proffered reason given
the prison system is safety, the courts will likely find that a compelling reason.
However, if the proffered reason is something akin to administrative convenience,
that will likely trigger higher scrutiny of the classification regime.296

Susan Etta Keller, Crisis of Authority: Medical Rhetoric and Transsexual Identity, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51,
59 (1999).
290. See supra Part i.A.
291. KATE BoRNSTFsN, MY GENDER WORKBOOK 280-81 (1998).
292. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1197 (D. Wyo. 2004).
293. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality) (arguing that "classifications based
upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny" where the proffered reason for the discrimination is "administrative
convenience").
294. Craig v. Boren, 428 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (rejecting administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently
important objectives to justify gender-based classifications (citing Frontiero,411 U.S. at 690)).
295. Id.
296. See DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194-96 (D. Wyo. 2004). Although it is
outside the scope of this Comment, it may be possible to argue for a heightened rational basis scrutiny because of
animus toward transgender prisoners. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cit. 2000). In Schwenk, a
defendant-guard argued that a transgender prisoner was not included within the meaning of the Gender Motivated
Violence Act because of being male. ld. at 1200. The court held that Schwenk was included under the protection
of the Act. Id. at 1200-02 (relying in part on gender employment discrimination claims such as Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and noting that for the purposes of both Title VII and the Gender Motivated
Violence Act "sex and gender have become interchangeable"). The court held that the "animus" requirement of the
Gender Motivated Violence Act "can be met not just by acts that are maliciously motivated, but also by acts arising
out of assertedly benign or even affectionate (though objectively harmful) impulses. In essence, what animus
demands is simply a strong emotion, such as is present in cases involving 'sex-based intent."' Id. at 1202. It held
that "rape by definitionoccurs at least in part because of gender-based animus." Id. at 1203 n. 14 (noting that "young,
slight, physically weak male inmates, particularly those with 'feminine' physical characteristics, are routinely raped,
often by groups of men" (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 852-53 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring))). One could
argue that Schwenk demonstrates that some animus exists towards transgender prisoners as a group.
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3. Immutability
Older equal protection cases also require immutability as a characteristic for class
creation."' Immutability as a class requirement is particularly inappropriate because
of the requirement that the sex characteristic be "an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth. 298 Transgendered status would not be
considered immutable, except perhaps for intersexed persons.2' This is especially
true where gender discrimination, at least in the employment law context, has been
read to apply specifically to biological women. 3" In other contexts outside of Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, gender identity has been
recognized as an immutable characteristic.3 °'
Many scholars have argued either for a broader based definition of gender
identity 30 2 which is generally self-assigned 30 3 or at the very least abolishment of
genetalia-based placement and classification according to gender identity. 3°4 Some
other countries have recognized problems with transgender prisoner placement.3 5

297.

Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility .. "
Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
298. Id.
299. But see supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
300. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 688 ("Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high
visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our
educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena."); Rosenblum,
supra note 14, at 562 (arguing that sex discrimination law has failed to acknowledge oppression of transgender
persons where "the enunciation of the gender binarism points to a reliance on the category of 'women' as the
unjustly subjugated, ignoring the broader phenomenon of gender, as opposed to biological sex, oppression").
301. See Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782,785 n. I (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing transgender petitioner's
sexual orientation and sexual identity as immutable in petition for asylum case where he alleged he would be raped
and beaten if returned to El Salvador); Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1095 n.7, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing transgender petitioner's female sexual identity was immutable in application for asylum case, but
declining to consider whether transsexuals constitute a particular social group, despite the fact that the petitioner
"manifests his sexual orientation by adopting gender traits characteristically associated with women").
302. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal
Conceptualizationof Gender That Is More Inclusive of TransgenderPeople, II MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 312
(2005) ("One way in which to define gender identity inclusively is: gender identity includes a person's identity,
appearance, or behavior, whether or not that identity, appearance, or behavior is different from that traditionally
associated with a person's gender assigned at birth." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
303. See Edney, supra note 196, at 337 ("Self identification of transgender prisoners has not been accorded
the appropriate degree of importance in the classification, treatment, and placement of transgender prisoners.").
304. See Barnes, supra note 14, at 645 (arguing that transgender prisoners should be placed according to
gender identity); Peek, supranote 14, at 1247 (2004).
305. A comparative analysis of other countries' policies regarding transgender prisoners is outside the scope
of this Comment. However, an international survey of correctional policies regarding transgender prisoners in
Australia, Canada, and the United States found only twenty percent of the sixty-four correctional departments'
studies had any kind of formal policy regarding transgender prisoners. Maxine Petersen et al., Transsexuals Within
the PrisonSystem:An InternationalSurvey of CorrectionalServices Policies, 14 BEHAV.SCI.&L. 219,224 (1996).
Twenty percent reported informal policies. Id. Only thirty-two percent clearly stated that post-operative transgender
women would be automatically housed in or transferred to a women's prison. Id. at 225. Most would make a
decision on a case-by-case basis, but at least two institutions stated they would not place post-operative transgender
women in a women's prison. Id. Eighty-five percent of the institutions surveyed either did not consider physical
or sexual assault a significant issue, or felt that increased risk of physical or sexual assault on transgender inmates
was unknown or had never been evaluated. Id. at 226. Despite the apparent dearth of policies regarding transgender
prisoner placement even among the international community, other countries increasingly have been alarmed at the
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Only one scholar has argued that gender identity should be recognized as a
fundamental right.3 "' That scholar also argues that equal protection under the
30 7
Fourteenth Amendment is more viable for claims by transgender prisoners. This
approach seems to abandon possibilities for further adjudication of transgender
persons' rights under the Eighth Amendment.
a. DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections
DiMarco's equal protection claim was denied. 0 8 DiMarco alleged that
'3 9
"individuals born with ambiguous gender are members of a quasi-suspect class.
However, the court disagreed that DiMarco fit a quasi-suspect class where she did
not demonstrate being "saddled with a disability"; membership of a group
"subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment"; or "in such a position of
' 31
political powerlessness to command extraordinary protection. 1
b. Deblasiov. Johnson
It could be argued that recognition of transgender prisoner claims for equal
protection could lead to frivolous lawsuits. In one case, a group of biologically male
prisoners brought a claim that alleged that grooming standards for male prisoners
violated equal protection where there was difference between the male prisoner
grooming standards and female prisoner grooming standards.31' In that case, the

treatment and placement of transgender prisoners.
In 2003, a Canadian appellate court heard a case regarding the placement of transgender prisoners.
Attorney Gen. of Can. v.Can. Human Rights Comm'n, [2003] F.C. 89. There, a transgender inmate initiated a
complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and disability for
her transgenderism. Id. at 4. The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) had a long-standing policy that, "unless
sexual reassignment surgery had been completed, male inmates shall be held in male institutions." Id. at 5.
The Human Rights Commission declared the policy regarding transgender prisoners discriminatory. Id.
at 8. However, the Human Rights Commission also found that placement of transgender prisoners within women's
facilities was not possible. Id. The transgender inmate appealed, arguing that the Human Rights Commission erred
in holding transgender prisoners could not be placed in women's facilities where there was no evidence CSC
seriously considered housing transgender inmates in any other institution other than those reflecting their biological
sex. Id. The appellate court upheld the Commission's decision finding that the presentation of evidence regarding
the risk transgender women would pose to biological women in female institutions was sufficient to make placement
of transgender women in those facilities impossible. Id. at 11. It affirmed the Commission's finding that CSC must
develop formalized policies, where its treatment oftransgender prisoners had been ad hoc and inconsistent, and CSC
staff had no formalized, requisite training for dealing with transgender prisoners. Id. at 10.
However, a comparative analysis of the United States' treatment of transgender prisoners with that in
other constitutional nations would only be useful with a larger base of case law for comparison. If this Canadian
case is not an anomaly, it could suggest that in other constitutional nations the notion of decency includes
recognition of the gender identity rights of transgender prisoners, requiring non-discriminatory penal classification
policies. See also Transsexuals Can Choosejails, NEws 24.coM, May 3, 2006, http://www.news24.comlNews24/
World/News/O,,2-10-1462_ 892464,00.html (noting that Spain is considering a policy whereby transgender prisoner
would be able to ask to serve their sentences in prisons corresponding to their new gender and prison authorities
also would address them by their preferred name).
306. See Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 565-69 (arguing for a fundamental right to gender identity, but also
recognizing that securing rights requires social change as well as legal recognition).
307. Id. at 567-69.
308. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1197 (D. Wyo. 2004).
309. Id.
see supraPart IV.A.2.
310. Id.;
311. Deblasio v. Johnson, 128 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319-20 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that policy required male
prisoners not have hair more than 1" thickness or depth whereas female inmates' hair cannot be longer than shoulder
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court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of gender-based
class distinction in state prison regulations, but determined that both the eastern and
western districts of Virginia apply an intermediate scrutiny.3" 2 Under that tier of
scrutiny, the state must show that (1) the challenged classification serves important
governmental objectives and (2) the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 13 The court found the
proffered purpose of prison security is not only important, but compelling. 31 4 It also
considered the discriminatory stringent hair length requirements on male inmates
was justified because male inmates are more violent than female inmates and pose
a greater security threat.3t 5
Specifically, if male inmates are more prone to violence than female inmates,
contraband in the hands (or hair) of such inmates poses a greater security threat.
Thus, in order to promote security, requiring male inmates to maintain shorter
hair is a discriminatory imposition that is substantially related to that
316
objective.

Although Deblasio appears to be a frivolous lawsuit, the court's reasoning appears
to rely upon sex and gender stereotypes. The court does not question the essential
meaning of the terms male nor female in its analysis and as a result does not
interrogate the assumption that males are more violent than females.3 17
B. PotentialProblems with Equal ProtectionClaims by TransgenderPrisoners
If litigants abandon the Farmer standard 31 8 and Eighth Amendment claims and
only attempt to adjudicate rights under an equal protection claim, the transgender
prisoner's vindication of individualized rights will be subsumed under an equal
protection class-formation analysis. Although at least one court seemed to apply a
319
discrimination standard to a transgender prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim,
32
°
most continue to follow some variation of the Farmerstandard. While the Farmer
standard affords at least some protection to transgender prisoners it still fails to
recognize the legitimacy of transgendered prisoners' gender identities.

length).
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part MI.A; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward,
it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior,
the objective itself is illegitimate.

Id.
318. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
319. Tates v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 WL 23864868 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003).
320. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
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C. ProceduralDue Process Claims under the FourteenthAmendment
At least one case opens up a different possibility not considered by scholars. In
DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 321 the court analyzed DiMarco's
procedural due process claim, finding it analytically essential that DiMarco was not
being placed in administrative segregation as a result of disciplinary problems but
rather only for safety reasons.3 22 DiMarco was denied a hearing on her housing
reclassification, which the court found concerning and alarming.323
[DiMarco], unlike those involved in a mandatory disciplinary hearing, did not
violate prison rules but simply arrived at the [prison] with certain physical
characteristics that she did not choose. [She] should have been allowed to at
prior to the [prison's] final decision
least let her thoughts and concerns be heard
3 24
to place [her] in solitary confinement.
The duration of DiMarco's segregated confinement for 438 days was "a sufficient
departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life" and thus atypical, triggering due
process protection.325
Under state law, decisions by prison officials to place an inmate in segregated
confinement do not implicate a due process claim unless it is "atypical and
significant. 3 26 Atypical and significant in this context would be where the
placement "exceeds the punishment of similarly situated inmates in duration or
degree of restriction."327
The court reiterated that DiMarco's segregated confinement was only due to "a
genetically created ambiguous gender" and that the prison had "plenty of time to
develop other more respectable, less harsh alternatives. 3 28 The court found the
prison's actions a violation of DiMarco's due process rights, because the prison's
329
decision was "completely arbitrary and capricious and without a rational basis.
Although this finding does not compel prisons to classify a transgender prisoner
in a certain manner, it does compel a prison to allow a prisoner a voice in her own
classification. The very nature of the legal system is one of mediated identities. A
litigant rarely speaks on her own behalf, usually speaking through an attorney as
advocate. In the context of transgender prisoners, those litigants are also precluded
from asserting a self-defined gender identity where the courts rely upon experts to
ratify a litigant's identity.330
At least through the recognition of a procedural due process right, a transgender
prisoner's own self-recognized gender identity can be voiced, although not
necessarily heard. This may be a pyrrhic victory, but the silencing of transgender

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

330. See supra Part I.A.
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prisoners within the classification system is a violation of procedural due process,
"'
at least within the Tenth Circuit.33
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL LEGAL TRAJECTORIES
The lower courts struggle with transgender prisoner claims because these claims
present complex issues involving medicine and psychiatry and how the basic
definitions of sex and gender inform a person's identity within the context of our
evolving society. In addition, the overdependence of the courts upon medical and
psychological experts, especially the prisons' own medical personnel, disempowers
transgender prisoners to assert an essential right to gender identity where it is not
endorsed by the medical community.
Although there are no easy solutions to the problems transgender prisoners face
within the penal system, at the very least a recognition of their identity and voice
breaks the silencing of that identity within the system. Gayatri Spivak famously
asked the question "Can the subaltern speak? ' 332 She wrote:
Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation,
the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a
violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the "third-world woman"
caught between tradition and modernization... [T]his opposition between subject
(law) and object-of-knowledge (repression).. .mark[s] the place of
"disappearance" with something other than silence and nonexistence, a violent
aporia between subject and object status.333
Similarly, the transgender prisoner vacillates between subject and object in the
Eighth Amendment context. She has no voice except through the assertion of a
procedural due process right to participate in her classification hearings. Even where
this procedural due process right is recognized, there is no assurance her voice will
be heard.
In addition, although classification based on self-identity would be ideal, it may
be viewed as unworkable by the courts. The assertion of a fundamental right to
gender identity may fall into the trap of prior rights-assertion movements. However,
laws define how we are "allowed to act" in the form of "rights." If we now
examine the relationship of this schema to the inner experience of the alienated
individual.. .we can discover how the schema is intended to "legalize" this

331. See DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo.2004). However, the litigant would
still have to satisfy the Mathews test to prove a violation of her procedural due process rights. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
332. See Gayatri Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271
(Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (discussing post-colonial power structures and the practice of
widow-sacrifice in Hindu law). Although Spivak originally wrote this piece around widow sacrifice, she spawned
an entire critical movement of subaltern studies that includes diverse fields such as feminism, cultural studies,
semiotics, deconstruction, and historiography. See generally Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Spivak.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
333. Spivak, supra note 332, at 306.
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experience and in so doing make the reproduction of alienation a condition of
group membership. 34

The courts will invariably require indicia of self-identity. Such indicia could
include changing of driver's license, birth certificate, letters from medical experts,
and living as the self-identified gender as objective criteria to adjudicate transgender
prisoners claims. But this outward indicia of gender identity still fails to recognize
the individual right to define self. In addition, the requirement of outward indicia
will inevitably lead to internal struggles within the transgender community where
there is disparate access to medical care and varying levels of difficulty within states
335
to acquire such things as a birth certificate or make changes to a driver's license.
The Eighth Amendment promises an evolving standard of decency in a civilized
society but fails to recognize the multiplicity of gender identities.336 Other legal
bases may provide the flexibility necessary to truly recognize transgender prisoners'
claims of gender identity. Equal Protection could provide better recognition of
gender identity because transgender prisoners might be able to collectively assert a
right to that identity. However, the assertion of a collective right would necessarily
require the drawing of lines to create a class that excludes people. Transgender
persons, as a group, may be too amorphous to draw meaningful legal distinctions
because those distinctions might still be based upon medical definitions of sex and
gender.
Procedural due process would provide a transgender prisoner a voice in her
classification process. Since procedural due process recognizes individualization,
it may be the best place for a transgender prisoner to assert her own self-identified
gender. However, there is no guarantee that her assertion will be given weight.
Although it affords her a voice in the process, it does not mean that her voice will
be heard and her identity meaningfully taken into account during classification.
There is a constant and consistent tension between the assertion of an individual
right and the impact on collective group identities.337 The response, then, to those
who are concerned with the right-assertion theory is deciding "the task...not to
disregard rights, but to see through or past them so they reflect a larger definition
of privacy...so that privacy is turned from exclusion based on self-regard, into
regard for another's fragile, mysterious autonomy...."3 38 There has been recognition
of individual autonomy rights within the sphere of privacy and liberty jurisprudence.
"Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,

334. Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62
TEx. L. REv. 1563, 1574 (1984).
335. See Loue, supra note 148.
336. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
337. [T]he "mechanisms" of reciprocal denial that alienation itself produces make it very difficult
for.. .movements to arise (for they amount to betrayals of the pact of the withdrawn selves), and
the fact that alienation "enforces itself' in part through the reproduction of hierarchical
differences virtually assures that such a movement will not arise the way it ought to-as a
universal response to our common predicament.
Gabel, supra note 334, at 1587
338. Williams, supra note 3, at 432.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

expression, and certain intimate conduct. ' 339 Although assertion of a privacy or
liberty right, or even assertion of individual autonomy may seem anathema in a
prison context, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
[a]n individual in prison does not lose "the right to have rights." A prisoner
retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to
be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a "person" for
purposes of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.3"
An essential component of personhood is one's gender identity.
The suggestions by scholars directed at prisons fail to address how courts should
deal with claims by transgender prisoners." Although ultimately the prison system
must change to accommodate and recognize the transgender prisoner and her
particular circumstance within the prison, if the court system does not also jettison
a gender binary logic, civil rights claims aimed at prison reform will fail. If the
transgender prisoner's rights do not have appropriate recourse through the judicial
system, the prisons themselves will have no impetus to recognize transgender rights.
However, the present adjudication model for transgender prisoner rights is failing
them.
Above all, legal binaries are not meaningful within the transgender prison
context. Indeed, transgender prisoners must have an essential right to their gender
identities, and must be given the ability to gain recognition of that right through the
Eighth Amendment and the other protections of the Bill of Rights. A right to selfidentified gender should be interpreted as part of the essential right to autonomous
personhood, an inherent civil right to define one's self.

339. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
340. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
341. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.

